Virtual Meeting: The State of Play in Ukraine

Efforts to end the war in Ukraine gained momentum in recent days as a result of newly developed peace plans. CFR fellows discuss the current state of play and prospects for peace in Ukraine.

This meeting is part of the Council’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security, which are made possible by the generous support of the Ed and Sue Wachenheim Foundation. 

STARES: OK. Well, thank you, Monica.

Hello, everybody. Welcome to this Council on Foreign Relations briefing on the current state of play regarding ongoing efforts to bring peace to Ukraine. I’m Paul Stares, senior fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations, where I also am the coordinator of the Council’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future.

So I think it’s fair to say the past ten days have been another head-spinning experience in the Trump administration’s nearly long—yearlong effort to end the war in Ukraine. By my account, this is now the third serious attempt to reach a durable ceasefire in Ukraine. The question now is whether this latest effort will be any more successful than previous ones.

Here to discuss this question I’m joined by three of my colleagues: Liana Fix, senior fellow for Europe; Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow for Russian affairs; and Stephen Sestanovich, the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies here at the Council too.

As is typical, I’m going to engage in a conversation with my three colleagues for about twenty minutes or so, and then we will open it up for Q&A.

So let me start with Tom. So we understand that tomorrow, Tuesday, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, along with President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is expected to meet with President Putin in Moscow to present, I think, the latest iteration of what began two weeks ago as a twenty-eight-point peace plan for Ukraine. We understand that this was drafted by both Witkoff and Kushner at the president’s direction following the successful mediation effort to end the conflict in Gaza. Over the last ten days, that draft, I think, has been substantially revised as a result of numerous meetings involving Ukraine and European officials. Yesterday, U.S. and Ukrainian officials again met, this time outside of Miami, to finalize the proposal to be delivered to President Putin tomorrow.

We don’t know exactly what has been agreed in those meetings, but we understand it’s a slimmed-down version of that twenty-eight-point plan, now around nineteen points, which Secretary of State Rubio threshed out in Geneva last weekend. But we also understand that important questions relating to territorial concessions or the disposition of forces at a ceasefire, as well as security guarantees for Ukraine, have been put aside and possibly be managed in a separate channel.

So, Tom, before these latest discussions in Miami, the kind of noises out of Moscow have not been exactly encouraging that Putin will accept what is likely to be presented him tomorrow. Both he and Foreign Minister Lavrov have already indicated that they will not accept anything that does not address what they refer to as the root causes of the conflict. So could you just tell us, for those on the call here, what are the principal sticking points for Russia? Are any of them negotiable? Is there any room for compromise here? And more broadly, you know, can President Putin afford to reject this latest initiative, which would be as I mentioned at the outset the third attempt by President Trump to bring an end to the war?

GRAHAM: Well, Paul, let’s step back for a minute. I mean, first, anybody who is under the illusion that Putin would accept the revised agreement is simply not listening to what’s going on at this point. That’s not going to happen tomorrow. Putin, however, has said that he will accept the twenty-eight points, also I presume the revised nineteen points, as a basis for discussion, which means that there’s some things he agree(s) with but there are very important issues that deal with the root causes which are not acceptable to Russia at this point. The two that you mentioned are at the top of the list.

The question of territory. Putin has been quite clear over the past three years and in recent statements that he wants all of Donbas, and unless Ukraine is prepared to cede all of Donbas then the fighting will continue.

Security guarantees is also a primary issue. Again, the Russians have been concerned from the very beginning about the size of the Ukrainian military, its weaponry, what type of support it will receive from the West, and whether NATO membership will be on the table. All those things I presume are not in the current document in a form that Russia is prepared to accept at this point.

So what Putin is most likely to say is: We had a productive conversation; there’s still points that need to be worked out—something that he has said before.

But there’s a little bit of a difference here this time, is that Putin doesn’t want to see Witkoff coming to Moscow to have these discussions. He really does want to turn this into what he would call a normal sort of diplomatic process where you get working groups together to work out the details of what are, in fact, very, very complex issues, where each side has significant differences and where there might be a possibility of bridging that.

So he wants this diplomatic process, I would argue, for two reasons. One, he does want to settle the Russia-Ukraine war, clearly on terms that are favorable to Russia. But beyond that, he also wants to start a real diplomatic process with the United States to talk not only about Russia-Ukraine but other issues that ought to be on the U.S.-Russia bilateral agenda, which include European security and strategic stability. It’s a way, in his mind, of pushing the relationship towards a more normal—a normalized diplomatic relationship, something that he wants, something that he desires, and something that he hopes continues beyond any—beyond any settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

STARES: OK. We will come back to talk about the Russian position and how this may play out in Moscow in a minute I’m sure.

Let me turn to Steve now. Steve, to say the least this has been a tumultuous week for Ukraine, and President Zelensky in particular. Besides having to contend with what seems to be an intensified military campaign by Russia against Ukrainian cities, Kyiv in particular, as well as sort of bat back another peace plan pushed by the United States which seems to be a call for Ukraine to make substantial concessions, President Zelensky has also had to deal with a growing corruption scandal that has already led to the resignation of his long-term chief of staff, Andriy Yermak.

So tell us—give us a sense of what the Ukrainians are trying to do at the moment. What is, essentially, their gameplan? Is it simply to signal to the U.S. that they are committed to peace and want to get a peace agreement, manage the issue at home, but really hope that Putin doesn’t say yes to this latest effort and really put them on the back foot? Can you give us a sense of how the Ukrainians are seeing the current initiative? And how do you think they will respond?

SESTANOVICH: Yeah. For the grimness of the, you know, Ukrainian leadership mood, you have only to look at or to listen to Zelensky’s speech week before last to the Ukrainian people, where he said, you know, we may have to choose between dignity and U.S. support. And his message to the people then was: We cannot allow ourselves to be against diplomacy. We are going to preserve our relationship with the United States by talking about the terms of a deal. We can’t just block them.

This is a grim forecast for him. I don’t think I’ve ever heard him quite so downbeat since the war started. But it’s not the first time that they’ve faced this situation and they have a kind of playbook for dealing with it, which is to emphasize their gratitude to the United States, their appreciation of the commitment to peace that President Trump has expressed many times, and to haggle about the terms. And in that haggling I think it’s important not to overlook the fact that the Ukrainians have some leverage, some cards. You know, way back in that famous February meeting with Zelensky Trump said you have no cards, but that’s not quite right because, of course, the United States cannot afford to look as though it’s manipulated by Putin, as though it’s granting a peace on terms that Putin has dictated.

You know, the revelations about the Russian—the Russian contributions to this twenty-eight-point plan have stirred some opposition in the Congress, in the media, in Europe. And Ukraine cannot look as though it’s, you know, too cynically exploiting those, but it benefits from every doubt that is publicly expressed by senators, by the Wall Street Journal, you know, revelations of semi-corrupt arrangements that are being made between people around Trump and Russian businessmen. The Russians have been undertaking this courtship for the—for the whole year.

The Ukrainians want to work on Secretary Rubio, whom they have found to be, you know, a more fair-minded supporter of their—of their outlook. They want to—they work on the Europeans. That’s why Zelensky was in Paris today; why he’s, you know, just had another call with Ursula von der Leyen.

Their view is that Trump is more willing to seem manipulated by allies than by Putin. And so far, that has turned out to be right. They are hoping that they can work that playbook again.

Now, you mentioned the corruption scandal. This has definitely been a big hit for Zelensky. He’s lost, as you noted, his longtime chief of staff. He says—he said today in Paris he’s looking at candidates, emphasizing that he’s also in favor of investigations of corruption. He’s feeling some pressure for—to create a unity government, maybe to appoint an outsider to replace Yermak; even some pressure from inside the Servant of the People Party.

But we should also not forget that his political weakness also makes it a little harder for him to make big concessions. And the big concessions that he’s—he and other Ukrainian officials have said they are not going to make are on sovereignty and territory. Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Florida, said those are the big sticking points. Yermak before him in the previous round of talks said no sane person would sign an agreement that gives away territory. And so that the only real issue to be discussed for them at this point is where the line of contact should be and not de jure recognition of Russian conquest, not any imposition of Ukrainian neutrality, and so forth. So they’re pretty dug in, and they feel they have a lot of support around Washington, around the administration, within the administration, across the transatlantic alliance, and they are working those levers as much as they can without sacrificing U.S. support.

STARES: Mmm hmm. Steve, just quickly, you drew an important distinction between de jure recognition. That suggests that they may be willing to compromise on sort of de facto control of occupied territories without conceding Russian sovereignty over them. Is that really the main point of concession that we might see out of these negotiations?

SESTANOVICH: Well, de jure recognition, even of the territory that the Russians now control, is out of the question for any Ukrainian official or politician. You know, you could say, well, one compromise formula might be they get all of Donbas but it’s not de jure, it’s just de facto recognition. I think the Ukrainians have committed themselves to the idea that they are—you know, the territory that they have—that they control now, they are not ceding merely to get a ceasefire. But, you know, one question here is how much pressure the United States is going to put on them to come up with such a compromise. We don’t know. But there have been lots of ominous kind of suggestions out of the administration that, you know, military assistance, financial assistance, intelligence assistance could all be held up if the Ukrainians are seen to be the obstacle to peace. That’s why they don’t want—as that Zelensky speech that I started with mentioned—they do not want to let themselves be cast as the opponents of diplomacy.

STARES: OK.

Finally, to Liana. So I think it’s fair to say that the Europeans have sort of felt themselves to be on the sidelines, or somewhat marginalized for most of this effort. I know they have had discussions with the Americans and with Ukrainians. But they are still essentially playing a supportive role here. Could you give us a sense of what their principal concerns are, what their red lines are? You know, how can they regain, I think, for want of a better term, some agency in this process? Is it trying to have a more substantial sort of source of funding to support Ukraine over the long term? We’ve heard a lot in recent weeks about these frozen assets. So give us a sense of the European perspective on all of this, and how you think they stand on these key issues that we’ve been discussing.

FIX: Yeah. Just, Paul, that Europeans have felt sidelined from the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia negotiations. But they have worked hard to establish some leverage for themselves. And they have been successful. If you look at the overall support that goes to Ukraine—militarily, financially, and humanitarian—Europe has taken over the United States by far. If you take together what Europeans are already spending on Ukraine, and have committed to spend for Ukraine, they are spending more than double than what the United States are doing. So on the financing side, on the supporting side, Europeans are in a much better position than they have been, let’s say, a year ago.

They have also moved in their discussion of Russian frozen assets. That has not only to do with Ukraine and with the lack of support coming from the United States, but also with European domestic constituents who by now are becoming tired of spending so many tax dollars on Ukraine, and obviously would love to see a different solution where Ukraine’s financial needs will be met by a reparation loan on Russian frozen assets, which is the proposal that is right now on the table and will be discussed at the European Council in December—on December 18.

What they are lacking, and where they are still dependent on the United States, are certain types of weapons for Ukraine. Though those are the weapons that they have agreed with the United States to buy from the U.S. for Ukraine. So this is sort of the newest arrangement to keep Ukraine afloat on these crucial weapon systems that Europeans cannot provide. And what they also cannot substitute is the intelligence sharing that is coming from the United States. So these are the two points where the United States administration actually still has leverage. And that’s why the Europeans, there—the European playbook is to keep Trump in with these two points, intelligence sharing and weapon sales for Ukraine.

And at the same time, what they’re trying to work on from their side is to make sure that it’s always Vladimir Putin who looks like the one who is in the way and who is the problem to negotiations. So from a European perspective—and one might say this is either more realistic—(laughs)—than the United States or less optimistic, depending on how one interprets the U.S. position—but the Europeans really don’t believe that Vladimir Putin is willing to negotiate on terms that are not—do not amount to either a military capitulation in the long term for Ukraine, or something that resembles Russia keeping those four regions, and then working hard to destabilize the west of Ukraine, to make it not a sovereign, free west Ukraine, whatever you want to call it, that can join the alliances that wants to join, that has unlimited access to Western military support.

So the Russian—that’s what the Europeans would want to see. They would be willing to accept what we see now as a de facto line, but only if the remainder of Ukraine can be free to pursue military defense in the future, to pursue the alliance that it wants, and also to be economically successful. But there are two proposals—although this, from a European perspective, resembles a little bit Groundhog Day—there are two parts of the latest proposals that have shocked Europeans. The two parts are, first, the Russian frozen assets issue. So at the moment when Europeans have finally moved towards trying to make those Russian fossil assets usable for Europeans, the United States proposes a deal that would basically mean Europeans handing over Russian frozen assets to a U.S.-Russia, investment fund.

That is, from a European perspective, just wild, and has really led to quite some emotional response of this is not acceptable, which is the reason why there’s some serious arm twisting going on now with Belgium. Belgium is being accused of using the tax—the tax income from the Russian frozen assets for its own budget, and that’s the reason why, some argue, it’s so unwilling to agree to the deal that Europeans have brought on. So Europeans are trying to get the Belgians on board to be faster on the Russian frozen assets. But the other part that has really shocked the Europeans is the NATO part, how NATO is portrayed in these twenty-eight points. For example, there’s one provision that says that the United States will be something of a mediator between NATO and Russia, which obviously, especially Eastern European NATO member states like Poland, find completely unacceptable. I mean, the United States is obviously a member of NATO.

But also, some smaller provisions. For example, that European fighter jets should be stationed in Poland instead of Ukraine, which could mean various things. For example, that a new deal on French fighter jets between Ukraine and France would mean that those could not be used by Ukraine but would have to stay in Poland. Those who are the least optimistic and most pessimistic interpretation of that provision is that you will see European fighter jets in Poland instead of U.S. fighter jets. So this possibility, and the ambiguity of words, although that might not be what has been actually meant by this very hastily drafted proposal, it’s obviously riling up Eastern Europeans because they see this proposal and the negotiations as having immediate impact on the NATO relationship. And they see it from the Russian side as testing out not only how far they can go on Ukraine, but also testing out how far they can go on NATO, and how far they can go with undermining the transatlantic alliance, and with Russia’s idea of rolling back NATO’s influence in Europe and rolling back the United States’ position in Eastern Europe.

So they’re doing the same playbook they always did, as Steve described. Pushing back, putting on red lines that will make Vladimir Putin appear as the one who is not willing to negotiate. But each attempt from the Trump administration to go again and again in such negotiations undermines the credibility of NATO, by extension too, from a European perspective.

STARES: OK.

So we have about maybe five, six minutes just to discuss how this might play out in the coming week. I’d be sort of interested if you think this is really the make-or-break moment in Trump’s efforts to bring peace to Ukraine.

Tom, you’ve already indicated that you think President Putin will neither accept nor reject what is presented to him tomorrow, and sort of push for a sort of more professional, drawn-out process of diplomatic negotiation. That really isn’t President Trump’s style, however. He wants a quick win here. And I don’t think he has the patience for what you think the Russians will propose tomorrow. Is that a fair understanding of the real tension here? Because I just don’t see how there is an obvious way in which Putin can move this forward without somehow alienating U.S. support, and we’re back to where we were—where we thought we were—just a month or so ago.

GRAHAM: Well, look, I mean, I think that is, quite frankly, not a fair assessment of where we are at this point. You know, President Trump has been at this for ten months. And we have been speculating over the past ten months, when is he going to finally wash his hands and walk away from this? And yet here we are in December, and he’s still at it. I think Putin is absolutely right. If you’re going to settle this conflict there needs to be a real diplomatic process. Experts need to be engaged. There are a lot of tough issues. A lot of things out on the table. I’m sure at the end of the day the Europeans and the Ukrainians would like to be engaged in a real diplomatic process where you make proposals, push back, and at the end of the day find something that is acceptable to all the parties engaged.

If President Putin doesn’t say yes tomorrow, and he’s not going to say yes tomorrow, I think the president will go through another iteration of this. The real thing that we need to look at is whether he is prepared put together a real working group that can work with the Ukrainians, with the Russians, and the Europeans in sorting this thing out. Look at the delegation that talked to the Europeans. If you’re serious about this, that same delegation or similar delegation ought to be talking with the Russians and ought to be talking with the Europeans as well. We’ll find out, I think, in the next week or two whether the president is prepared to go in that direction or not. But I still find it difficult to believe that he would simply walk away from this and wash his hands. He’s been engaged at this too long. There’s a political price to pay from walking away from this. And there’s still that Nobel Peace Prize out there beckoning that requires some action on his part.

STARES: OK.

Same question for you, Steve. You’ve already indicated that President Zelensky is in a, you know, acutely difficult situation, made worse by this corruption scandal. That he cannot really be seen to make any significant compromises. But I think the pressure is going to, if anything, ratchet up on Ukraine and so, you know, how long can they, essentially, play the game that they have in mobilizing European support, trying to stay on side with President Trump? Is this a sustainable strategy for them to pursue?

SESTANOVICH: I don’t think they’re counting on what Tom correctly predicts, you know, as an unlikely Trump response to all this, which is washing his hands and walking away. What they’re looking for is a recognition by Trump that Putin is, as he has put it several times, tapping him along. Because that would put on the table the question of whether there needs to be more pressure on the Russians to negotiate seriously.

One of the surprising elements in this entire discussion has been—and I don’t mean among us, but I mean globally, and certainly within the alliance and between the U.S. and the Russians and the Ukrainians and the Russians—is the absence of any discussion of a tougher policy toward Russia in order to exercise the kind of leverage that the United States clearly has. It could be increasing military assistance to Ukraine. It could be pushing more financial and economic assistance. It could be working with the Ukrainian—with the Europeans on the frozen assets question. None of that has been a live option. And I think it’ll be hard for the Ukrainians to move the United States to that situation. And yet, that’s really the only sort of, you know, situation-changing approach that the United States could take in trying to get Putin to adopt a different attitude toward all of these red lines and toward a negotiation.

You could have the kind of professional discussion that Tom has described while still having more pressure put on the Russians by the United States and the Europeans with more—you know, more aggressive targeting by the Ukraine inside Russia, more long-range weapons. Those two things don’t have to be separated. They actually have a natural pairing. If the United States wants to make progress on diplomacy, it has to use more leverage in order to move the Russians off their current position.

STARES: Mmm hmm.

Liana, so, you know, assuming there is some movement, we’re in some middle ground, neither a complete collapse but neither a rapid embrace of what is on the table, how do the Europeans—or, do you imagine the Europeans insisting that they have a seat at the table? And if so, how will this work? From listening to Tom, it seems to be, you know, an initial U.S.-Russia discussion, a Russia-Ukraine, and possibly a trilateral Russia-Ukraine-U.S. But I’m not hearing the Europeans actually having a voice at the table. How will this play in Europe? Because that doesn’t seem very appealing to Europeans whose security is essentially being discussed here too.

FIX: Yeah. So Europeans have been more outspoken in making clear that they have a voice, and that they can veto such proposals, and they cannot go ahead without European support. So I think that has actually resonated with the Trump administration. So they know that at some point—they will not call the Europeans first, they will not consult with the Europeans and the Ukrainians first. The tendency is always to consult with the Russians first and then go to the others. But at least there is some recognition that, you know, you need to bring the Europeans on board. And we saw this in the Geneva process.

Europeans don’t really believe that there will be an end to the war in the next year, whatsoever. And their concern with a professional negotiation process is that it will be misused by the Russian side to accelerate U.S.-Russia rapprochement and normalization. So to keep that track of the relationship sort of going, but on the expense of a fair solution to Ukraine. So they’re concerned that the interest in just normalizing relations with Russia is so high on both sides—on the United States’ side, on Russia’s side—that in the end Ukraine will be the compromise there, and the solution will be found which is not acceptable for Europeans or which will not enhance European security. Because, from their perspective, obviously Ukraine is the important buffer in European sort of security.

So what they’d like to see is that any rejection by certain red lines for Vladimir Putin could once again lead to a position where they’ve been before, a position where they think they have a transatlantic alignment on increased pressure on Russia. And they’ve been quite happy with the sanctions that have been taken with the U.S. side. They want to see more of that. And they hope through these continuous loops of negotiation attempts, pressure, negotiation attempts, pressure, over time something will build up that resembles actual pressure on Russia. And perhaps over the course of the next year will make Russia’s position worse, so that they are not so confident that they can get the upper hand and come through with maximalist demands in the negotiation process.

I think that’s the European game plan. It does not really include the hope that a fair solution in negotiations might be found. From their perspective, this is more or less just, you know, performative politics that they have to push back against, that they have to adapt. And then to try to focus on what is really important, which is to keep Ukraine in the fight and to make sure that Russia’s position worsens over time.

STARES: Got it. OK.

Let’s open it up for questions for those on the line. Please just raise your virtual hand and we can call out as questions come through. Do we have, Monica, any questions from the group?

OPERATOR: Yes.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

We’ll take our first question from Peter Clement. Please remember to state your affiliation. It looks like we’re having some technical difficulties. We’ll take the next question from Gideon Rose.

Q: Hi, there. Can you hear me?

STARES: Yep, we can, Gideon.

Q: Hi. Gideon Rose. Council and Barnard College.

Thank you for a great discussion, guys. One of my favorite movies about terrorism is Die Hard, because, of course, it’s not actually about terrorism at the end of the day but a bank heist. And one of the things that’s been really hard to figure out over the last year is that the U.S. policy towards the conflict in Ukraine doesn’t seem explicable by the kinds of straightforward national security logics that we all deal in here. And I’m wondering, is U.S. policy more explicable if you don’t see it as driven by a concern for national security, for European security, but if you just see it driven as a kind of bank heist? Are the actual players in charge of U.S. policy not concerned with Ukraine, not concerned with Europe, not even concerned with U.S. security, but rather simply concerned with private deals?

STARES: OK, I’m going to hand that off to Steve. My response would be it depends who you ask. But, anyway, go ahead, Steve.

SESTANOVICH: Well, Gideon has obviously read the fabulous Wall Street Journal investigative article called “Make Money, Not War.” And anyone who hasn’t read it should Google it and read. It’s a long, extremely well-documented piece that looks at the way in which the Russians, from the beginning of the year, have been pitching business deals to senior people in the Trump administration, Trump family, and in—and other, you know, American business and corporate interests, so as to make the economic payoffs for a peace deal seem irresistible. And that means treating the Russian frozen assets, that Liana referred to, as, you know, a playing ground for U.S. profit. Talking about rare earth deals, reviving Nord Stream under U.S. ownership, Arctic energy exploitation.

The entire picture here is exactly what Gideon says. The idea is, if you can pay off enough people in the, you know, senior levels of corporate America, and especially those with close ties to the Trump administration, you get peace. The title of the journal article is very apt. “Make Money, Not War.” And there is a kind of element of this in all of Trump’s diplomacy. And people who, you know, talk about how hardboiled a negotiator he is seem to me to miss, you know, what is, in a way, a kind of naïve conception of how international relations work. That, you know, if—we can all get along if we just—if we just do business deals. Thucydides would not recognize this picture of international relations.

GRAHAM: Paul, can I jump in here?

STARES: Sure.

GRAHAM: Because—

STARES: There’s quite a few on the list, so—

GRAHAM: OK, well, I’ll be very quick on this. The Russians have been doing this from the very beginning. They haven’t achieved the result that they want, in part because they don’t understand the political circumstances in which the president operates. He may be attracted by these commercial deals, but he can’t sell that to his own base. He can’t sell that to the American public. So, yes, we need to pay attention to that, but I still think there are American national security interests that are at play that are supported by certain people in the administration. And that’s one of the reasons the commercial deals haven’t done by the trick, as the Kremlin had hoped from January 20 of this year.

SESTANOVICH: Actually, Paul, let me add one thing to that, which is—because I completely agree with Tom here. I think the Russians have shown themselves to be poor analysts of American politics. The Ukrainians have been much better analysts of the Ukrainian—of American politics. And that has been part of their successful playbook this year. If you want just one little tidbit here to show the tin ear that the Russians have, Kirill Dmitriev, who’s been the Steve Witkoff interlocutor in coming up with these deals, just yesterday tweeted a praise of J.D. Vance making fun of Europeans. You know, showing that the Russians are trying to curry favor with, you know, people within the administration in this tone-deaf way shows they don’t get how the United States works.

STARES: Got it. OK. Let’s turn to Bill Courtney. Bill.

Q: Yes. Bill Courtney at RAND.

Prior to the current negotiations the Russian position and the Ukrainian position seemed so far apart that it didn’t look like negotiations would prosper. But here, we have these intensive negotiations. Are they taking place for any objective reason, or just because the United States is pressing for them?

STARES: Any takers?

GRAHAM: Yeah, I’ll take a start at that. Look, I mean, I think if you look at this objectively, both sides would like this conflict to end. You know, certainly that’s true for Ukraine. If you look at the losses that it’s taking, the damage to the economy, questions about how long it’s going to be able to man the front lines. The sooner they get a settlement that they can accept, that in their mind is fair and just, the better off they’re going to be. I think the same can be made—argument can be made for Russia, slightly different. You know, their economy is not doing that well. They’re taking horrific losses on the front lines, for marginal tactical gains. Every day this conflict continues the farther they fall behind the countries they want to compete against over the long run—China, the United States, Europe, and, I would argue, even India.

So I think there are objective circumstances that are pushing the two sides towards a serious set of negotiations. Now, there are very stark differences between the two sides. What is interesting about the past two or three weeks is people are beginning to think concretely about this. What’s acceptable, what’s unacceptable, what type of pressure we can apply, how do we push back, and so forth. So I think, contrary to the prevailing opinion in much of the West and even inside Russia, I think this is the best chance that the administration has of pushing this towards a resolution. The big question mark, of course, is whether the administration could put in place the proper diplomatic process to get to the result it wants in a timeframe that the president’s willing to accept.

FIX: I mean, there’s also one upside, just to add, that for the first time we actually have in a negotiation process a consultation between the U.S., the Europeans, and the Ukrainians on what their minimum positions are. And that is still sort of being worked out, but that has not been the case before. And I think that’s—it’s actually quite remarkable that it has not been the case before, in almost four years of wars. That even sort of the side of the war that actually thinks they are sort of more or less on the same side, even with the Trump administration, has not been able sort of to break down their position. So that’s sort of an upside to that.

And the other side is—which is sort of a little bit of an upside—is that there seems to be a realization that security guarantees have to play a role in the outcome, as is being put forward by the Ukrainians and by the Europeans again and again. Now, if the draft that the United States apparently has offered as a security guarantee actually amounts to anything, it’s unclear. And I think that’s why, from a European perspective, the question of Western troops, or at least European troops, in Ukraine is one that they also want to see in negotiations. Because that would strengthen Ukraine’s perception of a security guarantee, if European troops are allowed to be stationed in the west of Ukraine.

I know that Russia is against it, but that would help Ukraine to make concessions on other sides, for example, on the territory question, if it really has the impression that it is getting some kind of safety net that is not just a document from the United States that they are not sure they can rely on, but there are actually troops in the western part of Ukraine that might not be easily overlooked by Russia in the future.

SESTANOVICH: Bill makes a very good point here, though, which is that six weeks ago, remember, there was going to be the summit in Budapest between Trump and Putin. And in order to figure out whether there was a real basis for such a summit, the Secretary of State Marco Rubio called up the foreign minister. And they had a conversation. And Rubio’s report was, no change in the Russian position, no reason for a Budapest summit. What is interesting about the way in which the United States has interacted with the Russians is that they’ve not really been able to get the Russians to indicate a change in approach on any issue since Alaska. The Russians keep saying, you know, we had an agreement at Alaska and you guys aren’t living up to it.

That’s what Lavrov—every long statement that Lavrov makes in public boils down to, we have to go back to Alaska. Steve Witkoff has been very good at getting the Russians to talk to him and offer those deals that we were mentioning earlier. But he hasn’t been able to get the Russians to change their position on anything, just to restate it. In that sense, it’s not clear that there actually is a more promising basis for any negotiation. The difficult items have simply—you know, what got you down from twenty-eight to nineteen is taking all the hard issues out of the plan and putting them aside to be discussed later.

STARES: OK. Next question. We really got to move along here, guys.

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Angela Stent.

Q: Thank you very much. And thank you for your remarks. This question is for Tom Graham.

I’m curious about how you see Kirill Dmitriev’s role in all this. I mean we know, you know, he came here. He’s been negotiating with Steve Witkoff. We have the leaked phone calls that we’ve seen. But there are those that would argue that the real people, and you refer to it yourself, who would make the decisions in the end would be a normal diplomatic process. And that would be Sergei Lavrov, even though he disappeared for a while, but he’s come back, and of course Yuri Ushakov, who’s a key figure here. So how much influence do you really think that Dmitriev will have on this process?

GRAHAM: Short answer? Marginal. He’s a good interlocutor for Steve Witkoff, He’s not someone who’s calling the shots. He’s not formulating the policy. He has said that he doesn’t really understand politics, doesn’t engage in those matters. That’s for Ushakov and Lavrov to decide. I take him at his word with regard to that. So Ushakov and Lavrov are going to be the key people when it comes to real negotiations. Dimitriv will handle the commercial side of it, to the extent that there is a commercial side of it.

STARES: OK. Next question.

Q: We’ll take the next question from Serge Schmemann.

Q: Yeah. Good afternoon. Very helpful discussion, indeed.

I was going to ask Tom to comment on the point Steve made about leverage. Do you think that the United States should seek more leverage, either by providing more arms or through other means, at this stage? And what do you think the Russian reaction would be if they got a little tougher?

GRAHAM: Well, look, I mean, to follow up on what Steve said, dialogue or negotiation goes with leverage. You know, the Russians want to negotiate while they are continuing to fight on the ground because that’s their leverage over Ukraine, and over the Europeans to some extent—hybrid warfare tactics. We shouldn’t hesitate to exercise the leverage we have in dealing with the Russians while we’re talking to the Russians. That does come through the provision of weapons to Ukraine. I think an important part of our policy should be to try to stop the Russian westward advance on the ground in Ukraine, to provide Ukraine with the type of aerial defense it needs to reduce to a great degree the damage that is being done by this aerial assault. Sanctions, I am less convinced that they play the role that many in the West do, but the ones that we have there we ought to continue to enforce.

And then, contrary to the Europeans, as Liana explained it, I think offering a broader relationship with the Russians provides us with some leverage over the Russians, as long as we make it clear that there will be no tangible progress on the areas where we could be talking strategic stability—the Arctic, for example—absent progress in resolving Russia-Ukraine. As you know, Serge, for the Russians being a great power is a core element of national identity. The one country that can validate them as a great power is the United States. The one individual that can validate Putin as a major global leader is the president of the United States. For all the talk about Sino-Russia rapprochement at this point, Xi Jinping doesn’t carry the same weight with Putin in terms of validation that the president of the United States does. That’s leverage. We ought to figure out how to use it.

STARES: OK. Next question.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Aaron Miller.

Q: Great discussion.

Assuming that the conflict is tractable, and that the mutual end states of each side are reconcilable, what do each—are all four of you in agreement as to what the core, vital American national interest is, the must-haves as opposed to the it-would-be-nice-to haves?

STARES: I think we probably all agree that we don’t want to—we want to see Ukraine remain an independent, sovereign state and not become a vassal of Russia, as Belarus is. That Ukraine has the wherewithal to defend itself and deter any resumption of aggression. And that this in no way weaken the integrity of NATO. I think these are all common issues—common interests, rather, that probably we would all share. We may differ on the emphasis we’d give to each of those interests, but I think that’s probably how I would define us, our common position. But I’d let others speak. Liana, I think you were going to say something.

FIX: No, I mean, I think that’s very true what you said, Paul. I think the problem is that, I mean, again, looking at it from a European perspective, they are not clear about what sort of the new U.S. national security interest under the Trump administration are towards Europe. And I think that also defines what is sort of the core security interest towards Ukraine, and also towards NATO, right? I mean, if you take a position that is a more isolationist position, from the point of view of J.D. Vance or so on, of course, you want the war to end.

But you can accept much harsher conditions in Ukraine than you would be willing to accept if you think that the United States will continue to play a major role in Europe’s defense in the future, if you conceptualize the U.S. role as, you know, providing the nuclear umbrella, but no big conventional presence of the United States in Europe. This is all to Europeans. Then obviously you have a very different assessment of how this war needs to end and how you have to react to Russian aggression against NATO. I think that’s the challenge that Europeans grapple right now, right? I mean, so to what extent have U.S. national security interests fundamentally changed when it comes to Europe, and not only when it comes to Ukraine?

SESTANOVICH: I think Paul has captured the sort of positive elements of an outcome that the United States needs to seek here. You know, a sovereign, secure, prosperous, democratic Ukraine, and so forth. I think one can also capture this in a way that plays to Aaron Miller’s own regional specialization, by talking about the negative scenarios that could unfold that the United States needs to be very conscious of, and able to avoid. And it’s what I call the Syrianization of Ukraine. You can end up with a situation following a peace agreement in which Ukraine is weakened, destabilized, wracked by civil war, dissension, cross-border conflict. You know, a kind of outcome that is bad for the United States, because it shows we cannot work with our allies in order to create peace in Europe, is bad for our credibility with other great powers, and is bad for our—the prospect of being an effective, you know, kind of global leader of an alliance committed to protecting common interests.

And I think it’s terrible for domestic—for American domestic politics. You know, a lost war of a kind that I’m describing here is going to be really bad news for the president who oversees it. And is going to be very divisive in terms of American politics. I think there are negative outcomes that one ought to be thinking about, and that I don’t think the Trump administration is capable of imagining.

GRAHAM: Yeah, just quickly. I agree with Steve on that. But that’s also a challenge to the Europeans. You know, the goal here is not simply to end the conflict and end the fighting. The question is the future of Ukraine, and whether it does become a prosperous, sovereign, independent country that is on a European trajectory, or not. A lot will depend on how the Europeans think about Ukraine once the guns fall silent, and whether they are prepared to undertake the type of actions that are necessary to bring Ukraine into Europe. And, two, what Ukraine itself is capable of doing once the guns falls silent. Can it consolidate its democratic society? Can it rebuild effectively, and not fall victim to sort of vast corruption scandals because of the money that will be flowing into Ukraine as well? That’s the important question, what happens after the ceasefire, what Ukraine becomes? And that’s what we ought to be focused on. And I think too few people actually at this point focus on the challenges of getting the right Ukraine over the long term.

STARES: OK, last question—

FIX: I just want to caution very quickly, I think we have to be careful that we—sort of, we don’t outsource Ukraine’s future in Europe to the European Union. Because I think that’s something that the Trump administration and probably the Russians would be fine with, but I don’t think this will work. I think we can only see the future of Ukraine together with the EU and some perspective and relationship with NATO, not without that.

STARES: OK. I think we have time for one more question. And then I’m going to ask my colleagues a lightning round, as I did right before the Anchorage summit. So next question.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our last question from James Siebens.

Q: Thank you very much, all.

I wanted to ask, I mean, if we—if we go by public reporting, the twenty-eight point plan was crafted in Moscow, and delivered to the Trump administration, and sort of translated, a few points added maybe. But does the existence of that plan, and does that narrative, cut against the idea that Putin is not interested in negotiations whatsoever? Does it indicate that there are terms that Russia would be willing to settle on? And if so, do we not take it as some encouragement that there was essentially an Article Five-style security guarantee for Ukraine in there, and an explicit path to EU membership?

STARES: Tom.

GRAHAM: If the Russians had drafted the document, it would have been written in better English. (Laugher.) So I think they provided some information. The way it was worked is Steve Witkoff’s—largely his handiwork.

STARES: OK. We’re running out of time. I’m going to propose a quick lightning round to everyone. Where will we be a week from now? Will the process have moved forward or backward? Steve.

SESTANOVICH: (Laughs.) Well, I think the process can move forward by being stalemated. It just—what you need is a clarification, an awareness on the part of the president that right now the Russians are not talking his—are not talking the language of a real settlement, and that they’re tapping him along. And that means he needs to reassess and adopt a different approach, less that of a mediator and more of an interested party supporting Ukraine in order to change the balance of power, the balance of negotiating leverage. And that will—by moving backward from this, you know, endless series of Witkoff-Dmitriev conversations, allow a forward movement toward, you know, real—a real outcome.

STARES: OK. Liana.

FIX: I have to take the freedom to quickly respond to the previous question, because I just want to caution, I don’t think this is an Article Five security guarantee that has really been offered to Ukraine. And I also don’t think that EU integration, that Russia has accepted that, is actually a positive outcome there, because obviously Russia is only—or would—it’s not even clear if Russia will accept it. But if it will, it’s only with the idea that EU membership will not help Ukraine in any way, unless it’s NATO—coupled with NATO membership. And sort of also banking on Europeans that they will never manage to actually get Ukraine into the EU. (Laughs.) So, unfortunately, I don’t see these as positive outcomes. But I see other positive outcomes that I’ve mentioned before, a consolidated Western negotiation position.

I think in two or three weeks from now we will be in a situation of another round of frustration with Russia, and then possibly another round of U.S. actions, either in support of Ukraine, for example, with Tomahawk missiles, or the Hill will continue to push for a sanctions package and for a sanctions bill. In the long term, going through these loops again and again does damage not only U.S. support for Ukraine, but it also damages NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Because it allows Russia to bite away a bit again and again from the belief on the European side that the Americans are actually willing to come to the defense of Europe. So I think that’s from the Russian side a negotiation tactic that they achieve at the same time as weakening Ukraine, undermining the belief in NATO.

STARES: OK. Tom, very quickly.

GRAHAM: We’re moving forward in an iterative process that will lead to a ceasefire much more rapidly than anyone on this webinar anticipates.

STARES: And I would side probably most with Tom. I think actually we’re not destined for Groundhog Day this time again. And we, I think, may be on the cusp of some positive movement ahead here. So with that somewhat optimistic outlook, I’m going to bring these proceedings to an end. I want to thank everybody, again. Please don’t hesitate to look at the Council’s website on Ukraine, which has some terrific articles by my fellows here, and others. This is the Securing Ukraine’s Future website on the CFR.org. So please do avail yourself of that. With that, I will bring this to an end. And thank you again. Bye-bye.

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.