Much Ado About Maduro

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For President Donald Trump, Venezuela has become ground zero for his 21st-century corollary of the Monroe Doctrine—an experiment in power projection ostensibly motivated by a new war on drugs and rooted in the president’s belief that hemispheric dominance is a national security imperative. Trump has cast Nicolás Maduro as a “narco-terrorist” and illegitimate dictator, ordered U.S. special forces to destroy vessels allegedly ferrying cocaine northward to the United States, and positioned the largest constellation of American military assets in the Caribbean in decades. To unpack the logic, limits, risks, and upside of the administration’s Venezuela policy, I spoke with my colleague Will Freeman, the Council on Foreign Relations’ fellow for Latin America studies.

Michael Froman: The Maduro regime has a long history of transgressions—spanning human rights abuses, systemic corruption, and the slow suffocation of Venezuela’s civic life. This was true in Trump’s first term. It was true under President Biden. And it remained true when President Trump was inaugurated for the second time. So, what’s changed? Why this escalation now?

Will Freeman: It’s unclear what’s changed. The administration hasn’t explicitly answered the questions: “why now” or “why the pivot?” Let’s not forget—there has been a pivot. During Trump’s first term, he pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign against Maduro. But in the first several months of this year, Trump envoy Ric Grenell went to Caracas to negotiate. The administration also extended and expanded Biden-era sanctions relief, allowing Chevron to pump and Shell to develop an offshore gas field.

So, why the suddenly more aggressive posture? One possibility is that Secretary of State Marco Rubio increasingly has Trump’s ear and is pushing, again, for regime change. Rubio is personally invested in ending the leftist dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. He may believe it’s possible to oust Maduro without a land invasion simply by scaring him into giving up power or by generating enough fear among high-level military officials that they flip. If that’s the strategy, I think it’s, unfortunately, unlikely to succeed.

Another hypothesis is that Trump sees this as a relatively “low-cost” means of deterring the region’s drug traffickers. “Low cost” because in contrast to Mexico—where Trump has proposed striking cartels before—Venezuela is diplomatically isolated, much less important to us economically, and unable to really push back. This is the justification Trump has used in public, calling Maduro the leader of a “narco-terror” cartel flooding the U.S. with deadly drugs: a description that gets some things right (regime officials have colluded with traffickers) and others plainly wrong (most Venezuelan drugs go to Europe, while virtually all fentanyl and most cocaine enter the United States via Mexico).

If this is a signal to traffickers, it relies on two assumptions: first, that the strikes will intimidate gangs and cartels elsewhere into reducing drug shipments, and second, that these groups will have a harder time recruiting low-level smugglers because of increased risk. I’m skeptical. Drug traffickers are used to risking their lives. It's not clear that boat strikes—even expanded to the Pacific, like the strike we saw on Wednesday, will deter them.

MF: I’m not so sure the strikes won’t at least deter maritime trafficking. It’s one thing to fear arrest, another to fear a drone strike. When I look at the border crossing numbers, it’s clear that by deporting illegal immigrants to prisons in El Salvador or to Sudan, Trump has certainly deterred most would-be migrants from trying to make their way to the Southern border. But zooming back out, haven’t we seen this movie before—during Trump’s first term, under the guise of the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign? What’s different this time around, both in terms of the administration’s stated aims to reset the bilateral relationship and alter conditions on the ground in Venezuela, and in the means it is employing to achieve those ends?

WF: Trump tried “maximum pressure” during his first term to unseat Maduro. But the sequel is somewhat different. This time around, Trump has not explicitly set ousting Maduro as his goal, even if both the size of the military buildup and comments by other administration officials suggest as much. Instead, his stated aims are deterring drug traffickers and unauthorized migration. These more limited goals will allow him to claim “success” even if Maduro endures.

The second difference—somewhat paradoxically, given Trump’s more limited stated objectives—is that Maduro and his inner circle seem more frightened this time. They lost last year’s elections by a landslide and know whatever minimal base they once had is gone. They see a U.S. president unconstrained by traditional norms. They know that even if Trump is very unlikely to put boots on the ground, anything is possible—land strikes, or even a decapitation strike targeting Maduro.

Still, I don’t think the atmosphere of fear alone will push Maduro from power. He has too much to lose. Last, it’s interesting the administration is pressuring Maduro, this time, with a show of military strength, rather than by returning to a maximum pressure economic sanctions strategy—perhaps a tacit acknowledgement that sanctions may have contributed to worsening outmigration.

MF: A few days ago, three of the U.S. military’s nuclear-capable B-52 bombers flew south to the Caribbean in a remarkable show of force. There were also reports of B-1’s making similar such flights. But it’s not just B-52 bombers; we’ve massed a sizable contingent of U.S. warships, a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine, F-35s, drones, gunships, and thousands of troops within striking distance of Caracas. And now the entire Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group is being deployed to SOUTHCOM to support the pressure campaign. What’s your read on the military buildup—what can and can’t we do with these assets, and how are they likely to be perceived by the Maduro regime?

WF: First off, none of this looks like a normal counternarcotics operation. The last time we saw a buildup this large in the Caribbean was right before the 1989 invasion of Panama—the one that ousted dictator Manuel Noriega. We could do a lot with these assets. And Maduro, as I mentioned, seems scared.

But I think this is likely “military messaging,” not preparation for a land invasion. First, the roughly ten thousand military personnel in the area are not sufficient to hold and take much territory. We invaded Panama—a much smaller country—with thirty thousand troops, many of whom were already in the canal zone. Second, Trump confirmed that he authorized CIA operations inside the country, which is, let’s say, unusual. If there’s a land strike, I expect it might target an armed group encampment near the Colombian border: another bid to drum up fear, but not an existential challenge to the Maduro regime. The point is to pressure the regime, see if it snaps, and if it doesn’t, then extract concessions. The question is: what concessions?

MF: The administration has oscillated between secret negotiations—in which Maduro, reportedly in exchange for his political survival, offered the United States preferential access to Venezuela’s oil and mineral wealth—and an overt campaign of military and covert action aimed at ousting him. Do you believe pragmatic options that allow Maduro to remain in power are still on the table, or has policy now settled into a regime-change-or-bust posture?

WF: The Trump administration would of course prefer to see Maduro exit power. Trump recently claimed Maduro offered him “everything” but that he didn't accept. (The New York Times reported the same.) Again, Trump isn’t explicitly saying “Maduro must go,” but all signs point that way.

Still, without invading Venezuela or capturing or killing Maduro, I don’t see it happening. Maduro and his inner circle see giving up power as a question of life or death—and not just political life or death.

Dictators leave power when they have insurance—the protection of the military, amnesties, a power-sharing deal, or some other guarantee of their personal and political future—or when they are forced out violently. Every dictatorship in Latin America's history has ended through one of those two pathways, mostly the former.

Maduro has no insurance. If he loses power, his system of controlling the military through surveillance and patronage crumbles, and he won't be able to count on their loyalty. He can observe that most amnesties authoritarians granted themselves upon leaving power in Latin America were later overturned. And he’s an international pariah currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court. If he is lucky, he and his immediate family would make it to Russia or maybe Iran after leaving power. A big “if.”

So, he won’t leave power voluntarily, even under immense pressure. I believe the same is true of the rest of the regime’s top civilian and military figures. Unfortunately, without violence, I don’t see Maduro going. In the likely event he stays, I think Trump will give up on regime change (again) and pursue lesser concessions.

MF: What about the opposition? Edmundo González won the 2025 election in a reported landslide and was recognized by many democracies. And with María Corina Machado’s recent Nobel Peace Prize and her savvy outreach to Trump’s team, I hear rumblings that the opposition is more united and capable than most think.

WF: The opposition’s 2024 effort was heroic—organizing on an uneven field to win before Maduro stole it. But their courage doesn’t change the basic reality: power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Unless the military defects, which is unlikely, the regime stands.

Machado’s reputation as a hardliner helped galvanize the public but may have deepened already intense regime resistance to giving up or sharing power. Her promise of amnesty for the military likely rings hollow to those who fear retribution. History shows transitions from military rule in Latin America were usually led by moderate, technocratic lawyers or career politicians—not firebrands. I hate to say it, but for all these reasons, I don’t see a peaceful end to this story.

MF: To your point, many observers argue that Maduro has effectively coup-proofed his regime. How do you assess Maduro’s political security today, and what impact might the Trump administration’s militarized approach have on the regime’s internal dynamics and on the broader political climate inside Venezuela?

WF: I agree the regime has made every effort to make itself coup-proof and maintains tight control of the military, with the caveat that authoritarian civil-military relations are hard to read—especially since the 2024 jailing of Venezuela’s foremost expert on this topic, Rocio San Miguel. Maduro has used promotions to create a caste of leaders within the Venezuelan Armed Forces with access to special privileges and (illicit) revenue streams, including lucrative illegal gold mines. SOUTHCOM estimates there are two thousand generals and admirals in Venezuela. That’s one for every 70 troops.

Those are the carrots. Then there are the sticks. Generals, officers, and troops live under strict surveillance. Cuban-trained military counterintelligence officers detect and punish dissent by disappearing and torturing not only would-be military dissidents but also their family members. The regime quashed nine attempted mutinies by security forces from 2017 to 2020. The Trump administration may be hoping the U.S. military buildup will widen splits within the Venezuelan ranks—which Venezuela’s opposition perennially insists run deep—but I am not optimistic. A successful military coup requires a degree of coordination that is near-impossible under the current conditions.

MF: Of course, Venezuela and the United States do not exist in isolation. Maduro receives backing from Russia, China, Cuba, and other authoritarian partners. How do you see the administration’s new Venezuela policy reshaping the regional landscape? To what extent could external actors tip the balance, and how does Venezuela fit into the equation of great-power competition?

WF: It’s true—this isn’t playing out in a vacuum—but I think two factors matter most: how far Trump is willing to go and Maduro’s grip over the military. The importance of other external actors, I think, can be  overstated. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Russia, Cuba, and China have helped Maduro cushion the blow of U.S. sanctions. China, for instance, was buying roughly 90 percent of Venezuela’s oil as recently as August. But even if these countries were to revoke their support tomorrow, I doubt Maduro would fall. Venezuela is not hugely geopolitically important to either Russia or China, although it’s certainly convenient for antagonizing the United States and drawing attention away from challenges elsewhere.

That said, U.S.-Venezuela policy will have ripple effects for U.S.-China competition in the rest of the hemisphere. Leftist-led Brazil and Colombia, once more cautious toward China, have started expanding mil-to-mil and tech ties, respectively, startled by Trump’s protectionism and aggressive posture. I doubt that’s a coincidence. Leaders across Latin America are hedging, especially those who don’t align with Trump ideologically.

Also at stake in Venezuela are the world’s largest proven oil reserves and valuable deposits of gold, diamonds and coltan—that, no doubt, gives the country some geopolitical importance for the United States and Trump.

MF: Friends and former colleagues in Latin America used to lament that the United States didn’t pay enough attention to the region. Now they have all the attention they could ask for—and then some. What lessons should the administration and the American people draw from our history of involvement in the region—from the days of the Monroe Doctrine to the interventions of the early 20th century to the overt and covert activities of the Cold War period?

WF: Big question. Those interventions often triggered unintended consequences—sometimes quite bloody ones—and alienated much of the region. But I think we have to be careful not to automatically assume too many parallels between the Cold War and today. I expect the regional pushback to U.S. escalation in Venezuela, if it comes, will be more muted than the type of regional pushback the Reagan administration got for covert intervention in Nicaragua, for instance. Very few leaders will want to look like they are defending Maduro, a deeply unpopular dictator. But we should be wary of pushing regional governments that see our foreign policy as aggressive or reckless toward China. In Brazil, it’s already happening. The USSR was not a major trade partner of any big Latin American countries during the Cold War. The United States was the only game in town. Now Latin America has another option.

Let me know what you think about U.S. policy towards Venezuela and what this column should cover next by emailing [email protected]