China in the Indo-Pacific: August 2025

China’s Foreign Minister Talks Borders and Partnership in New Delhi: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi for a series of discussions with Indian officials from August 18 to 19, notably cochairing the twenty-fourth iteration of Special Representatives’ (SR) talks on the Sino-Indian “boundary question,” the ongoing dispute between China and India over control of contested territories bordering Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Wang also met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi ahead of Modi’s visit to China for the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit. In discussions with Indian External Affairs Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar, Wang declared that China and India should view each other as “partners” as opposed to “adversaries or threats.” The foreign ministers’ dialogue on August 18 marked the first meeting between the two officials in three years, after armed confrontations in the Galwan Valley disrupted China-India relations in 2020.

During the Chinese foreign minister’s meeting on August 19 with India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, who serves as New Delhi’s representative and Wang’s counterpart in SR talks on border issues, the two officials reportedly established several new “border management mechanisms” to facilitate de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—the de facto boundary that separates Chinese and Indian territory in the Himalayas—according to readouts after the meeting from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and India’s Ministry of External Affairs. Though the SR talks remain focused on eventually achieving formal delimitation, both parties agreed to resume direct flights between the two countries, reinvigorate cross-border trade in controlled locations along the LAC, and ease visa issuances for tourists, businesses, and members of the media after the most recent round of dialogue.

China Deepens Ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan: Following his visit to New Delhi, Wang met with his counterparts from Afghanistan and Pakistan for a trilateral summit hosted by the Taliban government in Kabul on August 21. The three parties in attendance—Wang, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi—reaffirmed their commitment to “anti-terrorism cooperation” and “economic partnership.” China and Pakistan have maintained close ties for decades, with Pakistan consistently identified as a top recipient of funding from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a major export market for Chinese arms sales, and a key ally through the countries’ All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership. During the summit in Kabul, Wang notably extended a formal invitation to the Taliban government to participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistani authorities expressed hopes that the expanded agreement would not only attract more Chinese investment to the region but also “boost trade with Central Asia.”

Modi in China: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in seven years to attend the 2025 SCO Summit. Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Modi alongside leaders from member-states Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the northeastern port city of Tianjin from August 31 to September 1. With China chairing the organization for the 2024–25 term, readouts from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused heavily on China’s aims of maintaining global order and facilitating “multipolarity” within the international system through greater cooperation between members. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, analysts have frequently interpreted that phrasing as indicative of the country’s own “vision of global relations,” in which “the West plays a diminished leadership role, while non-Western countries step up to help shape a multipolar world order.” Established in 2001 by the Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), the SCO has since expanded from its original formation and focus on regional security issues to include states such as Belarus, India, and Iran, and to propagate strategic rhetorical alignment on a worldview alternative to the West’s “perceived . . . double standards” for the rules-based global order.

Modi’s presence at the summit attracted attention as he was pictured holding hands and engaging in close conversation with Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Though his attendance at the SCO meeting complemented a preplanned visit to Japan representative of India’s broader strategic pivot toward East Asia, local and international media has largely framed the Indian prime minister’s trip to China as an isolated event indicating rapprochement between China and India, especially in the wake of President Donald Trump’s aggressive new 50 percent tariff rates on Indian exports. Since the start of the year, China and India have increased “official visits” and discussed easing cross-border restrictions on trade and tourism. During a bilateral sideline meeting at the SCO summit, Xi and Modi both emphasized the importance of resolving tensions surrounding the contested China-India border in the Galwan Valley, which has served as the site of several bloody clashes between the two countries’ militaries since 2020.

Pakistan’s SCO membership and presence at the summit presented a stumbling block within the context of that apparent revitalization of Sino-Indian relations, with regional rivalries between India and Pakistan continuing to impede China’s aim of showcasing the SCO as a unified bloc. Given the recent deterioration of India’s relationship with the United States due to trade tensions and India’s professed adherence to strategic autonomy, it remains to be seen whether the supposed revival of China-India ties displayed at the summit will usher in any fundamental realignment of strategic partnerships—instead, it could demonstrate India’s symbolic prioritization of “economic stability over entrenched rivalry.”

Southeast Asian Participation in the SCO Summit: Five Southeast Asian leaders attended the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1. Although not formal members of the SCO, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Myanmar were in attendance. Cambodia has been a dialogue partner since 2015 and Myanmar gained recognition in 2023, while Laos officially received dialogue partner status during this year’s summit. Xi unveiled his new Global Governance Initiative (GGI), the fourth iteration of his diplomatic frameworks alongside his Global Civilization Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Security Initiative. Southeast Asian countries voiced support for the GGI, with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim endorsing the initiative as a tool to restore trust in multilateralism, while Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono stated that the GGI aligns with his country’s development agenda.

Three of the leaders gave addresses at the SCO Plus Summit. Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính became the first Vietnamese leader to address an SCO summit, during which he emphasized the country’s commitment to addressing security challenges and promoting sustainable development. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet emphasized similar themes and reiterated that Cambodia is a “peace-loving nation” that chooses dialogue over confrontation following its conflict with Thailand in July. In his endorsement of the GGI, Anwar told the SCO Plus Summit that the new initiative indicated the existing multilateral system had “somewhat failed,” citing the United Nations’ inability to address climate change and trade issues.

Along with China’s military parade commemorating the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II on September 3, the summit offered a venue for bilateral meetings. In his meeting with Xi, Phạm pledged Vietnam would strengthen strategic exchanges and defense-security cooperation with China. At the same time, Vietnamese state media said the pair “engaged in frank and sincere discussions on maritime issues,” in reference to the countries’ competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. On the economic front, the pair discussed China Huadian Engineering Co.’s agreement to develop a renewable energy ecosystem in Vietnam. The deal is structured using a “1+1+1+N” framework, which involves establishing a business entity, a research center, a manufacturing base, and multiple investment projects within the country. Yadea Group Holdings Ltd. also agreed to establish an electric vehicle ecosystem in Vietnam, which would include charging-station infrastructure.

Xi directly called on Hun Manet to crack down on the cyber-scam centers that thrive in Cambodia, with the bilateral readout saying the countries need to “resolutely crack down on cross-border crimes such as online gambling and telecom fraud.” Despite performative raids on compounds, experts say Cambodian political elites are deeply complicit in the country’s illicit cyber scamming industry. The statement mentioned specific infrastructure development projects, including the Industrial and Technological Corridor and the Fish and Rice Corridor, the latter of which aims to develop the agricultural sector in the Tonle Sap Lake region. China views the project as a way to bolster its food security.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto postponed his visit to China due to widespread popular unrest across the country, sparked by outrage over an increase in housing allowances for parliamentarians. He later met with Xi on the sidelines of China’s military parade. China’s readout of the meeting stated that Prabowo’s determination to attend, despite domestic difficulties, demonstrated the importance he attaches to the relationship and voiced support for Prabowo’s governance.

In his bilateral meeting, Prabowo secured Xi’s support for accelerating Malaysia’s full membership to the BRICS bloc, of which it is currently a partner country. Moreover, Anwar negotiated an extension of the East Coast Rail Link, a BRI project to connect Malaysia’s underdeveloped east coast with its more prosperous west coast. Anwar told reporters he discussed extending the rail link to the Thai border with Xi and Premier Li Qiang.

Finally, Xi met with Thongloun Sisoulith, general secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Xi noted that the two parties needed to prioritize coordination on the China-Laos Railway. A new section of the railway linking Vientiane to Yuxi, Yunnan, began two-way freight services in August. Analysts believe Laos’s decision to join the SCO as a dialogue partner allows the country to present itself as part of a larger multilateral network, rather than simply as a satellite of China.

Myanmar Junta Officials Visit China: August marked a significant uptick in formal engagements between the junta and Chinese officials, during which long-standing issues, including the junta’s planned December election, earthquake reconstruction, cyber-scam centers, and BRI projects, were repeatedly discussed. On August 14, junta Foreign Minister Than Swe met with Wang in Yunnan Province for the tenth Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout of the meeting said the junta welcomed a Chinese observing team for the anticipated election. China has pressured the junta to hold a poll amid the civil war, even though it struggles to control less than half of the country’s territory. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, which won the 2020 election that prompted the military to launch a coup, is banned from participating.

China also admonished the junta to “take concrete measures to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions and projects in Myanmar, further combat cross-border crimes, and maintain peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border.” The comment referenced China’s ongoing concern about the security of its investments and personnel as part of its Belt and Road development projects in the country, as well as the cyber scam compounds on the China-Myanmar border that target Chinese citizens. Additionally, junta troops opened fire on Chinese Red Cross workers providing emergency relief to earthquake victims in April.

The following day, China brought together the foreign ministers of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand for an informal discussion on Myanmar’s civil war, opaquely referred to as “the Myanmar situation” or “the Myanmar issue.” The group pledged to step up law enforcement collaboration, especially on online gambling, telecom fraud, drug and weapon trafficking, and human trafficking.

At the end of August, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing visited Beijing, where discussions focused on similar topics. Myanmar news outlets reported that Min Aung Hlaing thanked China for pressuring the ethnic armed groups fighting the junta.

Scarborough Shoal Collision: A Chinese Coast Guard cutter and a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA) destroyer collided with each other while preventing a Philippine patrol boat from entering waters near the Scarborough Shoal on August 11. The Philippine Coast Guard was attempting to provide fishermen with food and resupply at sea. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner said the Philippines believes the PLA Navy ship was trying to ram the Philippine Coast Guard vessel. A few days later, Malaysia hosted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Kuching.

Later in the month, China expanded its deployment of armed coast guard small boats and military aircraft to the Second Thomas Shoal. The confrontation is part of a long-running standoff over the Philippines’ resupply of its grounded BRP Sierra Madre ship. The Philippine military noted that the vessels were upgraded with mounted weapons.

Chinese Support for Malaysian Rare-Earths Processing: Malaysia’s Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability Minister Johari Abdul Ghani said China is prepared to offer the country technical and technological assistance to develop its processing of rare-earth elements. China dominates the global mining and processing of rare earths. According to a 2019 estimate by Malaysia’s Minerals and Geosciences Department, the country possesses 16.1 million metric tons of rare-earth deposits; the government has banned the export of raw rare earths to support its burgeoning domestic processing industry. Beijing stipulated that any cooperation would have to involve its state-backed companies. In a written parliamentary reply, Abdul confirmed that Xi agreed to the proposed collaboration during his April visit to Malaysia, citing China’s emphasis on safeguarding technology as the reason.

Laotian Wind Power Project Launches Operations: On August 22, Laos commenced operations for Southeast Asia’s largest onshore wind farm in the Dak Cheung District of Sekong Province and the Sanxay District of Attapeu Province—an area twelve times the size of Manhattan. The Monsoon Wind Power Project will sell 100 percent of its generated energy to neighboring Vietnam. The project’s backer, PowerChina, has been involved in over 150 projects in Laos in the last three decades. Laos has become known as the “battery of Southeast Asia” through a slew of Chinese-backed renewable energy projects, including a series of hydroelectric dams along the Mekong River. Laos has incurred an unsustainable level of Chinese debt to finance the transition, however, prompting analysts to voice concern that the landlocked country is facing a looming economic crisis and lacks leverage to push back against China’s future demands. To reduce its debt burden, Laos ceded significant control of its national power grid to a Chinese state-owned company for a period of twenty-five years in 2021.